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Abstract
China has realized that for its own sake and from the international community’s
perspective, it cannot afford to continue along the conventional path of encouraging
economic growth at the expense of the environment. Accordingly, the country has
placed ecological goals at the same level of priority as policies on economic, political,
cultural and social development. Specifically, to meet the grand goal involves not only
capping China’s nationwide coal consumption to let it peak before 2020 and carbon
emissions peak around 2030, but also putting in place a variety of flagship programs
and initiatives, prices and policies. This paper argues that the 2030 carbon emissions
peak goal is ambitious but achievable and concludes by arguing why China’s
anti-pollution outcomes this time might be different from the previous ones.
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1. Introduction
Following three decades of rapid economic growth, China is facing a variety of
daunting challenges. On environmental side, domestically, dense smog and haze,
which frequently hit in Beijing and other places in China, and steeply rising oil
imports raise great concern about a range of environmental problems and health risks
and energy security. Internationally, given that China is already the world’s largest
energy consumer and carbon emitter and that its energy use and carbon emissions
continue to rise rapidly as it is rapidly approaching to be the largest economy in the
next one to two decades, China is facing great pressure both inside and outside
international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in combating global climate
change. Thus, China, for its own sake and from the international community’s
perspective, cannot afford to continue along the conventional path of encouraging
economic growth at the expense of the environment.
The Chinese leaders are fully aware of these challenges the country faces. In
response, the 18th Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China adopted a general policy of Ecological Civilization, placed ecological goals at
the same level of priority as existing policies on economic, political, cultural and
social development, and emphasized that Ecological Civilization would be fully
implemented in all aspects of economic development.
With the grand vision of Ecological Civilization, the issue is then how China
explores concrete, constructive and realistic solutions in the 13th five-year (2016-20)
plan (FYP) and beyond in order to be successful in making its transition to a
low-carbon, green economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses that China’s key
energy-related environmental challenges lie in capping nationwide coal consumption
to let it peak in the 13th FYP and carbon emissions peak around 2030. Section 3
discusses flagship programs and initiatives, prices and policies that are put in place in
response to these challenges in order for China to genuinely transform into a
low-carbon economy. Section 4 concludes by arguing why the outcomes this time
might be different from the previous ones.

2. Cap coal consumption by 2020 and carbon emissions by 2030
Burning coal contributes to the overwhelming majority of national total sulfur dioxide
emissions, dust, nitrogen oxide emissions and CO2 emissions in China, and has given
rise to unprecedented environmental pollution and health risks across the country
(Zhang, 2007 and 2011a; CCCCPPRP, 2014). Moreover, given that China’s energy
mix is coal-dominated, cutting China’s carbon intensity to meet its climate
commitments by 2020 is in fact cutting its energy intensity, and abating CO2
emissions in China is closely linked to rein in its energy consumption in general and
its coal consumption in particular. Clearly, when China’s coal peak is crucial to
determine when China’s carbon emissions would peak and to materialize ecological
civilization goal.
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2.1 Cap nationwide coal consumption to enable its peak in the 13th FYP
Both China and India rely heavily on coal to fuel their economies, but coal accounts
for a much larger share in China’s energy mix than that of India. As the world’s
largest coal producer and consumer, China produces and consumes about twice as
much coal as the U.S., the world’s second largest producer and consumer. Coal has
accounted for over two-thirds of China’s primary energy consumption for several
decades. Coal-fired power plants dominate total electricity generation in China,
consuming over half of the total coal use. As a result, China’s total installed capacity
of coal-fired power plants is more than the current total of the U.S., the United
Kingdom and India combined.
China’s National Energy Adminstration initially proposed to cap total national
energy consumption in mapping out the 12th five-year (2010-15) plan, but that
national cap was not included in the plan for a variety of reasons (Zhang, 2011a).
Dense smog and haze that frequently hit in Beijing and other places in China, which is
the combined effect of heavy airborne pollution and meteorological conditions, has
sparked China’s determination to cap coal consumption and combat air pollution, in
an effort to ease mounting public concern over air quality. The so-called Atmospheric
Pollution Prevention Action Plan released by the State Council (2013) aims to scale
back coal’s proportion of energy consumption to 65 percent by 2017 in order for the
concentration of hazardous particles, including PM 2.5, to drop by ten percent in all
cities compared with 2012.
In physical terms, on average, coal production in China increased yearly by 200
million tons over the past 10 years, but increased by 50 million tons in 2013; in
percentage terms, coal use increased yearly by 9 percent over the past 10 years, but
increased by 2.6 percent in 2013. The key challenge for China in the 13th FYP is to let
coal consumption to peak in 2016-2020 by undertaking strict measures. This would
lead the resulting CO2 emissions to be estimated to peak in 2025-2030, and coal’s
share in the total energy mix to be estimated to be below 50 percent in 2030 (Wang,
2014; Zhang, 2014a).
The key challenge for China in the 13th FYP is to let coal consumption to peak in
2016-2020 by undertaking strict measures. This would lead the resulting CO2
emissions to be estimated to peak in 2025-2030, and coal’s share in the total energy
mix to be estimated to be below 50 percent in 2030 (Wang, 2014; Zhang, 2014a).

A1. Energy conservation and carbon mitigation in key energy-consuming
industries
Given that industry accounts for about 70% of China’s total primary energy
consumption, few key energy-consuming sectors are crucial for China to meet its own
set energy-saving and carbon mitigation goals. So the Chinese government has taken
great efforts towards changing the current energy-inefficient and
environmentally-unfriendly pattern of industrial growth. During the 13th FYP, China
needs to further explore and enhance industrial policies to encourage technical
progress, strengthen pollution control, and to promote industrial upgrading and energy
3

conservation in key industries in order to meet the increasingly stringent
energy-saving and emissions-cutting commitments.
Indeed, a sectoral approach can serve as the first step under a prospective
international climate treaty. Wang et al. (2015) argue that the cement, steel, aluminum
sectors in China can be among the first group to be covered under the sectoral
approach. This recommendation is very in line with the proposal made in Zhang
(2000) that a combination of a targeted carbon intensity level with an emissions cap at
a sector level is the most stringent commitment that China can make around or
beyond 2020.
A2. Cut coal consumption in absolute terms in severely polluted regions
Capping coal consumption not only requires enhanced efforts in key
energy-consuming sectors, but also unprecedented, coordinated regional efforts, in
particular in more developed and severely polluted regions. The Atmospheric
Pollution Prevention Action Plan (The State Council, 2013) sets more stringent
concentration targets for hazardous particles for more-developed areas, with the
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta required to
cut levels by 25 percent, 20 percent and 15 percent respectively. To that end, coal
consumption in these more advanced and severely air polluted regions should not
increase, and be further cut in absolute terms in the 13th FYP.

2.2 Capping carbon emissions around 2030
2.2.1 Why around 2030 for timing China’s absolute emissions caps?
Many factors need to be taken into consideration in determining the timing for China
to take on absolute carbon emissions caps. Zhang (2010 and 2011a,b) argue from the
following six angles that China could cap its greenhouse gas emissions around 2030.
First, the fourth assessment report of the IPCC recommends that global
greenhouse gas emissions should peak by 2020 at the latest and then turn downward,
to avoid dangerous climate change consequences. With China already the world’s
largest carbon emitter, the earlier China takes on emissions caps, the more likely that
goal can be achieved. However, given China’s relatively low development stage and
its rapidly growing economy fueled by coal, its carbon emissions are still on the
climbing trajectories beyond 2030, even if some energy saving policies and measures
have been factored into such projections. All the integrated assessment models
examined by the European Commission-funded LIMITS (Low climate IMpact
scenarios and the Implications of required Tight emission control Strategies) project
foresee that China’s carbon emissions under the baseline scenario would peak in the
second half of this century, with 2080 as the median year across models (Tavoni et al.,
2015). A recent joint Tsinghua-MIT study suggests that in the so-called continued
effort scenario under which China will maintain its Copenhagen pledge momentum
and achieve a carbon intensity reduction rate of approximately 3% per year from 2016
through 2050,1 China’s carbon emissions would not peak until 2040, while China’s
1
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carbon emissions under the baseline scenario would not peak until 2050 (Zhang et al.,
2014).
Second, before legally binding commitments become applicable to Annex I
(industrialized) countries, they have a grace period of 16 years starting from the Earth
Summit in June 1992 when Annex I countries promised to individually or jointly
stabilize greenhouse gases emissions at their 1990 levels by the end of the past
century to the beginning of the first commitment period in 2008. This precedent
points to a first binding commitment period for China starting around 2030.
Third, with China still dependent on coal to meet the bulk of its energy needs for
the next several decades, the commercialization and widespread deployment of
carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a crucial option for reducing both China’s and
global CO2 emissions. Thus far, CCS has not been commercialized anywhere in the
world, and it is unlikely, given current trends, that this technology will find large-scale
application either in China or elsewhere before 2030. China’s report of the Deep
Decarburization Pathways Project and the aforementioned joint Tsinghua-MIT study
share this view. Both of them project no CCS facilities on power plants by 2030, and
CCS facilities on about 90% of coal-fired power plants and 80% of natural gas fired
power plants by 2050 assuming that CCS technology will become commercialized
after 2030 (Teng et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). Until CCS projects are developed to
the point of achieving economies of scale and bringing down the costs, China will not
feel confident about committing to absolute emissions caps.
Fourth, developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate
national climate policies and measures. This is understood by knowledgeable U.S.
politicians, such as Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-MA), the
sponsors of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Indeed, the
Waxman-Markey bill gives China, India and other major developing nations time to
enact climate-friendly measures. While the bill called for a “carbon tariff” on imports,
it very much framed that measures as a last resort that a U.S. president could impose
at his or her discretion not until 1 January 2025 regarding border adjustments or tariffs,
although in the middle of the night before the vote on 26 June 2009, a compromise
was made to further bring forward the imposition of carbon tariffs.
Fifth, another timing indicator is a lag between the date that a treaty is signed and
the starting date of the budget period. With the Kyoto Protocol signing in December
1997 and the first budget period staring 2008, the earliest date to expect China to
introduce binding commitments would not be before 2020. Even without this
precedent for Annex I countries, China’s demand is by no means without foundation.
For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
grants developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the
scope of economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of
magnitude larger than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, it is arguable that
intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. This raises the issue of
whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. See Zhang
(2011a,c) for detailed discussion on stringency and credibility issues related to
China’s carbon intensity commitment and their implications.
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developing countries should have a grace period much longer than 10 years, after
mandatory emission targets for Annex I countries took effect in 2008.
Sixth, while it is not unreasonable to grant China a grace period before taking on
emissions caps, it would hardly be acceptable to delay the timing beyond 2030. China
is already the world’s largest carbon emitter and, in 2010 it overtook Japan as the
world’s second largest economy, although its per capita income and emissions are still
very low. After another twenty years of rapid development, China’s economy will
overtake that of the world’s second-largest emitter (the U.S.) in size, whereas China’s
absolute emissions are well above those of number two. Its baseline carbon emissions
in 2030 are projected to reach 12.0 billion tons of carbon dioxide, relative to 5.3
billion tons for the U.S. and 3.7 billion tons for India (IEA, 2013), the world’s most
populous country at that time. This gap with the U.S. could be even bigger, provided
that the U.S. would cut its emissions to the levels proposed by the Obama
administration and under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. By
then, China’s per capita income will reach a very reasonable level, whereas its per
capita emissions of more than 8.0 tons of carbon dioxide are projected to be well
above the world’s average and about 3.3 times that of India (IEA, 2013). While the
country is still on the climbing trajectory of carbon emissions under the business as
usual scenario, China will have lost ground by not taking on emissions caps when the
world is facing ever alarming climate change threats and developed countries will
have achieved significant emissions reductions by then.
2.2.2 Peaking around 2030 is ambitious but achievable
A recent joint Tsinghua-MIT study suggests that in the so-called continued effort
scenario under which China will maintain its Copenhagen pledge momentum and
achieve a carbon intensity reduction rate of approximately 3% per year from 2016
through 2050,2 China’s carbon emissions would not peak until 2040, while China’s
carbon emissions under the baseline scenario would not peak until 2050 (Zhang et al.,
2014). This means that China would bring the peaking year forward to 2030, at least
ten years earlier than under the so-called continued effort scenario, when it commits
to cap its carbon emissions around 2030. Therefore, from this perspective, this
commitment is ambitious.
Measured in other ways, however, the story differs. One way is to examine
whether emissions peak in 2030 is consistent with the 2°C target. The LIMITS models
project that China’s emissions should peak in 2020 under both 450 parts per million
(ppm) and 500 ppm scenarios in order to achieve the 2°C target by the end of 2100
(Tavoni et al., 2015).3 Other studies in Figure 1 by the Energy Modeling Forum and
SSP suggest that China’s emissions should peak in 2020-25 in order to achieve the
2

At the Copenhagen climate change summit, China pledged to cut its carbon
intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. This raises the issue of
whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. See Zhang
(2011a,c) for detailed discussion on stringency and credibility issues related to
China’s carbon intensity commitment and their implications.
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This does not say the issue of who pays. Tavoni et al. (2015) show that, with a per
capita allocation China would get a higher allocation of emissions allowances than
with the equal cost allocation.
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same 2°C target. Clearly, China’s commitment to let GHG emissions peak in 2030
does not seem to be consistent with the 2°C target in any of the three scenarios.
Moreover, as shown by Figure 1, China’s GHG emissions must decrease very quickly
for the 2°C target to be achieved. This suggests that even were China to be successful
in reaching this target, the necessary emissions reductions after the peak year are
unlikely to be achieved (Carraro, 2015).

Figure 1 China’s GHG emissions from 1990 to 2100
Source: Carraro (2015).
Another angle is to look at what costs the emissions peak would be achieved. The
China and the New Climate Economy report suggests that under the moderate growth
scenario, capping China’s carbon emissions around 2030 would cost 0.02% and 0.06%
of China’s GDP in 2020 and 2030, respectively, without consideration of other
benefits of carbon abatement (He et al., 2014). The European Union’s commitments
to cut its GHG emissions by 30% relative to 1990 levels are widely considered less
stringent, partly because the European Commission analysis found that a 30% internal
reduction would cost 0.2 to 0.3% of GDP in 2020. If a 30% reduction were part of an
international agreement, GDP impacts vary between -0.6% to 0.6% in 2020 (Klaassen
et al, 2012). In percentage terms, the estimate of China’s loss is very small, and is one
magnitude of order less than that of the EU. While China is not expected to to exhibit
greater ambition than the EU, the latter being seen to have greater capacity, capability
and responsibility, the small loss projected for China could be interpreted as meaning
either that China’s commitments of peaking level would be less stringent or that the
peaking year could be further brought forward.
But it is achievable based on the model projections and on the action ground. The
LIMITS models project that China’s emissions would peak slightly later than 2030,
based on the commitments that China made prior to the joint China-U.S. climate
statement in November 2014 (Tavoni et al., 2015). If China’s commitments to have
non-fossil fuels to meet its 20% of energy demand by 2030 in that joint climate
7

statement (The White House, 2014) is factored in, then China’s commitments to cap
emissions by 2030 are in line with what the LIMITS models foresee in the pledge
scenario (Tavoni et al., 2015). On the action ground, as discussed in Section 3.2 on
low-carbon city, with increasingly stringent energy-saving and carbon intensity goals,
China began experimenting with low-carbon city development in five provinces and
eight cities on 19 July 2010. This experiment is further expanded to the second batch
of 29 provinces and cities on 5 December 2012 (Wang et al., 2013). All the pilot
provinces and cities under the low-carbon city or region development program set
CO2 emissions peaks in 2030 or earlier although it is not mandated by the central
government.15 pilot provinces and cities even aim for a CO2 emissions peaks in 2020
or earlier, with Shanghai publicly announcing 2020 as its peak year, 2020 for Suzhou
and 2015 for Ningbo (Zhang, 2015). In 2015, NDRC plans to select 10 model cities of
varying kinds from these 42 pilots to further explore and support the implementation
measures aimed at the emissions peaking in these selected cities before 2030, thus
leading the whole country to the emissions peaking (21SO, 2014). Clearly, the
practices and ambitions of the pilot regions have set good examples for keeping
emissions under control, making positive contributions to overall low-carbon
development in China, and thus possibly contributing to making its carbon emissions
peak occurring even sooner than the aforementioned timeline.
2.2.3 At what level that peak would be?
Under the joint China-U.S. climate statement by the Presidents of China and the U.S.
on 11 November 2014 in Beijing, China has pledged to cap carbon emissions by 2030
or earlier (The White House, 2014). However, how China’s carbon emissions are
likely to develop or at what level they will finally peak is still an open question. The
peaking level is of great interest and concern, not only for China but also for other
countries.
In theory, purely from the perspective of climate commitments, China could let
its emissions peak at a high level around 2030, and then cut emissions from that high
level. That would ensure that China would meet its international commitments. The
counterargument is that China cannot afford to do that because dense smog and haze
has become a major issue and triggers mounting public complaints. The anti-pollution
policies and measures taken help get emissions down.
Just like estimates of peaking time differ, estimates of peaking level also differ
significantly across studies. Jiang et al. (2013) suggest that China’s carbon emissions
would peak at 9 Gt CO2 in 2030 under low-carbon scenario. The peaking level could
go down to 8.5 Gt CO2 under enhanced low-carbon scenario. These estimates might
be too optimistic, assuming widespread adoption of more advanced low or zero
carbon technologies without factoring in adoption costs and behavior changes. Teng
and Jotzo (2014) suggest China’s carbon emissions peaking during the 2020s,
returning to a level below the 2020 level by 2030, and backing to around current
levels by 2040. With CO2 emissions in 2013 estimated to be 9.1 Gt CO2 based on the
revised energy statistics released in February 2015 by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (2015), which adjusts upward coal consumption in 2013 by 589
million tons, this suggests the peaking level of 10.6 Gt CO2 in 2030. The
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aforementioned Tsinghua-MIT study suggests that China’s carbon emissions would
peak at 12.1 Gt CO2 around 2040 in the so-called continued effort scenario and 10.2
Gt CO2 around 2030 in the so-called accelerated effort scenario (Zhang et al., 2014).
Taken these estimates together, my educated estimate is that China is most unlikely to
reveal its peaking emissions level in 2030, and if China would do, it would not be
lower than 10 Gt CO2 in 2030.4
China’s peak level is of importance to other countries as well because it
will affect the carbon space left for others in order to keep temperature rise below 2°C
degree. India’s Council on Energy, Environment and Water (2015) shows that, given
the available global carbon space and China’s dominance, India would have very little
carbon space left if China decides to level off its carbon emissions at 12 Gt CO2 as the
continued effort scenario in the aforementioned Tsinghua-MIT study suggests.

3 Programs, prices and policies towards the transition to a low-carbon
economy in China
3.1 Strengthening and expanding flagship programs and initiatives and
supportive economic policies
China has implemented a variety of programs and initiatives, and supporting
economic and industrial policies and measures targeted for energy saving and
pollution cutting in the 11th and 12th FYPs (Zhang, 2015). Flagship initiatives of
significant nature include, but are limited to, the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy
Conservation Action Program, the 10,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Low
Carbon Action Program, and mandatory closures of small power plants while building
larger, more efficient units.
Supportive economic policies are also implemented to encourage technical
progress and strengthen pollution control to meet the energy-saving and
environmental control goals. To support energy-saving projects, since August 2007
the Ministry of Finance and NDRC (2007) has been awarding enterprises in the east
RMB 200, and those in the central and western parts of the country RMB 250 for
every ton of coal equivalent (tce) saved each year. Such payments are made to
enterprises that have energy metering and measuring systems in place that can
document energy savings of at least 10000 tce from energy-saving technical
transformation projects. Since July 2011, such awards are increased to RMB 240 for
enterprises in the east, and RMB 300 for those in the central and western parts of the
country for every tce saved each year and at the same time, the minimum
requirements for total energy savings from energy-saving technical transformation
projects are lowered to 5000 tce from the previously required amount of 10000 tce
(Ministry of Finance and NDRC, 2011). The government also introduced energy
4
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submitting its intended nationally determined contributions to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change on 30 June 2015, which details its
commitments to climate change mitigation and adaptation in the post-2020 period.
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management companies (EMC) to promote energy saving. The central government
awards EMCs RMB 240 for every tce saved, with another compensation of no less
than RMB 60 for every tce saved by local governments. Taxes are used to promote the
purchase of smaller cars. The excise tax on a car with an engine less than one liter is 1%
of its value, whereas a four-liter engine is taxed at 40% of the car’s value. Renewable
vehicles, like electric, hybrids and fuel-cell cars, are exempt from purchase taxes until
the end of 2017. Policies favorable to flue gas desulphurization (FGD)-equipped
power plants are being implemented, e.g., the on-grid tariff incorporating
desulphurization cost, priority given to be connected to grids, and being allowed to
operate longer than those plants without desulphurization capacity. Some provincial
governments have even more favorable policies, such as priority dispatching (Teng et.,
2014) of power from units with FGD in Shandong and Shanxi provinces. The
government has offered power price premium for denitrification, and has charged
differentiated power tariffs and tiered power tariffs (Zhang, 2014a).
China needs to further strengthen and expand these programs and initiatives and
supporting policies to keep China’s energy demand and pollution under control and to
meet the purposes of both conserving energy and resources and mitigating climate
change and protecting the environment.
3.2 Enhancing scope and level of the low-carbon city development in the context
of government decentralization and unprecedented urbanization
Globally, including in China, cities have contributed to the most to economic output
and have accordingly given rise to the majority of CO2 emissions. In China, cities are
responsible for more than 60% of total energy consumption, and their contribution
continues to increase given the expected urbanization rate of 65% by 2030 (Li, 2014).
Clearly, given such unprecedented urbanization, cities will play an even greater role in
shaping energy demand and CO2 emissions in the 13th FYP and beyond. Therefore,
cities are the key to meeting China’s proposed carbon intensity target in 2020 and
whatever climate commitments beyond 2020 that China may take. The low-carbon
city development experiment in these 10 provinces and 32 cities (see Figure 2) in the
context of government decentralization will test whether they can meet the challenge.
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Figure 2 Two batches of low-carbon pilot cities in China
Source: Y. Wang et al. (2015).
However, the past three decades of economic reforms have witnessed a shift in the
control over resources and decision-making to local governments. This devolution has
placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials and polluting
enterprises who are more concerned with economic growth and profits than the
environment. The ability of and incentives for lower-level governments to effectively
implement energy-saving and pollution-cutting policies are therefore critical (Zhang,
2011a, 2012). With increasingly stringent energy-saving and carbon intensity goals,
China began experimenting with low-carbon city development in five provinces and
eight cities on 19 July 2010. The experiment was further expanded to a second batch
of 29 provinces and cities on 5 December 2012 (Wang et al., 2013). Relative to the
first batch of low-carbon pilots, the application process of the second batch of
low-carbon pilots is much more transparent. The NDRC Department of Climate
Change issued in April 2012 a Circular on Organization and Recommendation of
Applications for the Second Batch of Pilot Low-carbon Provinces and Cities (NDRC,
2012). This Circular lays out the four conditions on which provinces or cities are
eligible for applications. First, leaders of governments who attempt to bid under this
low-carbon development pilot call attach great importance to green, low-carbon
development. Second, such potentially hopeful regions should have set the specified
targets for low-carbon development, such as their carbon intensity, the share of
non-fossil fuels in the total primary energy mix, and carbon sinks and forest coverage
rates in the 12th five-year plan period. Third, they should play an exemplary role in
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promoting green, low-carbon development and in developing innovative low-carbon
development way that would be of great value to other regions. Fourth, they should
compile, put forward and submit their preliminary implementation plan of low-carbon
pilots (NDRC, 2012). This fourth condition is the key difference between the
application of the second batch of low-carbon pilots and that of the first batch. In the
application of the first batch of low-carbon pilots, the applicants only need to submit
the application materials, and would not require to submit their implementation plan
of low-carbon pilots until they are selected to be the pilot regions (Wang, 2012).
Based on the overall assessment of the submitted materials, field visits and the experts’
evaluation, 29 provinces and cities are selected of over 40 applicants in the second
batch. Clearly, the low-carbon city development experiment in these selected 10
provinces and 32 cities in the context of government decentralization will serve as the
test ground to see whether they can stand up to the challenges.
All these pilot provinces and cities are making efforts towards strengthening
industrial restructuring and technological upgrading, improving energy mix and
energy efficiency, prioritizing public transport and promoting efficient public
transport systems, and optimizing urban form. In this process, however, Wang et al.
(2013) found that these provinces and cities have confronted with a variety of
problems and challenges. They include, but are not limited to, the absence of sound
carbon accounting systems, lack of low-carbon specific evaluation system,
insufficient government-enterprise interactions, and excessive budget dependence on
land concession. Moreover, the central government does not provide any preferential
policies and financial support to the pilot provinces and cities, which may serve as
one of their real motives for applying for the low-carbon pilots. These pilots may be
given priority if low-carbon development special fund is establshed and provided in
the future. But no low-carbon development special fund in place now may restrict
these pilots to achieve their full potential and meet with the expectations of why these
pilots are established in the first place.
While these are areas that need further improvements, there are encouraging signs
that this low-carbon pilot program moves in the right direction. An NDRC evaluation
revealed that the ten pilot provinces cut their carbon intensity by 9.2% in 2012
relative to their 2010 level, a rate much higher than the national average of 6.6%
(NDRC, 2014a). In addition, all these pilot provinces and cities set CO2 emissions
peaks in 2030 or earlier, with 15 pilot provinces and cities even aiming for CO2
emissions peaks in 2020 or earlier (Zhang, 2015).
3.3 Increasing the widespread use of renewable energy
From a long-term perspective, widespread use of renewable energy is a real solution.
Increasing the share of renewable energies in the total primary energy supply not only
enhances energy security, but also is environmentally friendly and conducive to good
health. This has created a new impetus for encouraging the use of renewables
worldwide. China has targeted alternative energy sources to meet 15% and 20% of its
energy requirements by 2020 and 2030, respectively. The Chinese government has
also identified the development of the renewable energy industry as one of the seven
12

strategic emerging industries.
Not only is China setting extremely ambitious renewable energy goals, more
importantly, China is taking dramatic efforts to meet these goals. Solar energy had
been supported initially with investment subsidies through so-called “Golden Sun”
program. After years of simply taking advantage of overseas orders to drive down the
cost of manufacturing solar panels, feed-in tariffs for solar power were enacted in July
2011 to form its own solar power market. Wind power had benefited from the
bidding-based tariffs since 2003. Since August 2009, this supportive policy for wind
power was replaced by feed-in tariffs. Under this new policy, four wind energy areas
are classified throughout China, based on the quality of wind energy resources and the
conditions of engineering construction, and on-grid tariffs are set accordingly as
benchmarks for wind power projects across the nation, respectively. With an installed
capacity of 103.4 GW, China overtook the US for the first time to lead the world’s
total renewable energy capacity in 2010, pushing the US to a distant second in total
installed capacity of 58 GW (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011).
However, for solar PV, the domestic solar power market is still in the initial stage
of development. Both the key technology and the demand, namely, the solar PV
industry, relies heavily on the overseas market. For wind power, the converter,
gearbox, bearing and generator are still dominated by foreign companies or imports
(Yu, 2013). So the key challenge for China in the renewable energy area is how to
build from its success in the installation in the 12th FYP to further improve technology
levels, in particular for those key components and parts of renewable technologies
that China has still relied on foreign advanced technologies and to further enhance
pace and scale of installation and use in the 13th FYP.
3.4 Harnessing the market forces to genuinely transform into a low-carbon
economy
China needs to complement administrative measures with market-based approaches
and tools in the 13th FYP. To date, China has relied mostly on administrative means to
achieve its set energy-saving goal for 2010. Qi (2011) shows that during the eleventh
five-year plan period, total CO2 reductions reached 1.25 billion tCO2e through
mandatory regulations and auxiliary financial stimuli, while only 0.035 billion tCO2e
were reduced as a result of market-based instruments. In the end, China has had
limited success in meeting its goal. Learning from this and confronted with increasing
difficulty in further cutting energy and carbon intensities, going forward, China has
realized that administrative measures are effective but not efficient. It is becoming
increasingly crucial that it harness market forces to reduce energy consumption and
cut carbon and other conventional pollutants and genuinely transform into a
low-carbon, green economy during the 13th FYP.
The Chinese leadership is well aware of this necessity. This is clearly reflected in
November 2013 by the key decision of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China to assign the market a decisive role in
allocating resources. This will serve as the overcharging guidance on mapping out the
13th FYP.
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3.4.1. Getting the energy prices right
To have the market to play that role, however, requires getting the energy prices right
because it sends clear signals to both producers and consumers of energy. While the
overall trend of China’s energy pricing reform since 1984 has been to move away
from pricing entirely set by the central government in the centrally planned economy
and towards a more market-oriented pricing mechanism, the pace and scale of the
reform differ across energy products (Zhang, 2014a).
To date, the reform on electricity tariffs has lagged far behind, and accordingly
the government still retains control over electricity tariffs. This complicates
implementing the pilot carbon trading schemes in the power sectors in China. The
latter creates a new impetus for power pricing reforms to allow the pass-through of
carbon costs in the electricity sector as a result of implementing carbon trading. Thus
power pricing reforms will be the key area for reform in the 13th FYP.
Natural gas prices are also the pressing area for further reform. Given
coal-dominated energy mix in China, increasing a share of cleaner fuel, like natural
gas, has been considered as the key option to meet the twin goal of meeting energy
needs while improving environmental quality. However, natural gas price has long
been set below the producers’ production costs, and does not reflect the relationship
between its supply and demand, or alternative fuel prices. This has not only led
Chinese domestic gas producers to be reluctant to increase investments in production,
but also has constrained the imports of more costly natural gas from abroad. The
government has changed the existing cost-plus pricing to the “netback market value
pricing” in Guangdong province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region
(NDRC, 2011). Under this new pricing mechanism, pricing benchmarks are selected
and are pegged to prices of alternative fuels that are formed through market forces to
establish price linkage mechanism between natural gas and its alternative fuels. Gas
prices at various stages will then be adjusted accordingly on this basis. The pilot
schemes in Guangdong and Guangxi provide the right direction to establish a
market-oriented natural gas pricing mechanism. China needs to take lessons learned
from the two pilot schemes and examine what kinds of adjustments and improvements
are needed regarding the choice of alternative fuels, the selection of the pricing
reference point and the creation of netback market value pricing formula in order to
implement the Guangdong and Guangxi pilot reform program to the entire country in
the 13th FYP (Gao et al., 2013; Zhang, 2014a).
3.4.2 Resource tax reform
Even if the energy price reform is undertaken, however, from a perspective of a whole
value chain of resource extraction, production, use and disposal, energy prices still do
not fully reflect the cost of production. Thus, combined with the pressing need to
avoid the wasteful extraction and use of resources, getting energy prices right calls for
China to reform its current narrow coverage of resource taxation and to significantly
increase the levied level (Zhang, 2014a and 2015). The resource tax levied on crude
oil and natural gas by revenue rather than existing extracted volume, which began in
14

Xinjiang 1 June 2010 and was then applied nationwide beginning 1 November 2011,
is the first step in the right direction. China have further broadened that reform to coal,
overhauling the current practice and levy on coal based on revenue beginning 1
December 2014. The Task Force on Green Transition in China of the CCICED (2014)
recommends that a higher resource tax should be imposed on fossil fules, with tax
rates raised to at least 10% preferably 15% for domestic and imported coal, and to
10-15% for domestic and imported oil by 2025. This will also help to increase local
government’s revenues and alleviate their financial burden in order to incentivize
them not to focus on economic growth alone (Zhang, 2010 and 2011a).
3.4.3 Imposing environmental taxes or carbon pricing
Right energy prices from a perspective of a whole energy value chain also need to
include negative externalities. Clearly, the imposition of environmental taxes or
carbon pricing can internalize externality costs into the market prices. These
market-based instruments, if established, will serve as a cost-effective supplement to
costly administrative means on which China has mainly relied to meet its current
energy saving goal.
The introduction of environmental taxes to replace current charges for SO2
emissions and discharged chemical oxygen demand has been discussed in both
academic and policy circles in China for quite some time. Draft tax law on
environmental protection was released in June 2015 for public comments (Legislative
Affairs Office of the State Council, 2015), but the timing of its revision and eventual
passage of Chinese legislature as a law is unknown and accordingly its exact
implementation date has not been set yet; the sooner environmental taxes are imposed
in the 13th FYP, the better, but it should not be later than 2020. As experienced in
environmental taxes in other countries, such taxes will initially be levied with low
rates and limited scope, but their levels will increase over time. Moreover,
environmental taxes should be shared taxes, with the majority of the revenue going to
local governments.5 However, in terms of timing, given that China has not levied
environmental taxes yet, it is better to introduce environmental taxes first in the 13th
FYP, not least because such a distinction will enable to disentangle China’s additional
efforts towards carbon abatement from those broad energy-saving and
pollution-cutting ones.
The whole legislation process of amending the existing environmental law and
promulgating environmental tax law takes time, and until it is completed, there is no
legal basis to authorize the levy of these taxes. In the meantime, there is the pressing
5

The central government intends to replace existing environmental fee and
charge by an environmental tax. But 90% of the revenue for the
environmental fee and charge goes to the local governments (Tian and Xu,
2012). That means that if environmental tax at the beginning is charged at a
level that could replace the existing environmental charge and fee, the
majority of that revenue should be local in order to respect current
distribution of the revenue between central and local governments.
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need to meet with the energy and emissions targets in a cost-effective way. I believe
that a combination of these considerations motivates China to go for emissions trading.
In late October 2011, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2011)
approved seven pilot carbon trading schemes in Beijing, the business hub of Shanghai,
the sprawling industrial municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing, the manufacturing
center of Guangdong province, Hubei province (home of Wuhan Iron and Steel,
Shenzhen), the special economic zone across the border from Hong Kong.
There are features in common in these pilot trading schemes. These pilot
trading schemes all run from 2013 to 2015 and, except for the Chongqing pilot where
multiple gases are considered, all other pilots cover only CO2 emissions. The pilots
cover emission sources at enterprise levels, which is different from the EU and
Californian emissions trading schemes which cover emissions of installations or
facilities. Moreover, unlike the EU ETS, indirect emissions from both electricity
generation within the pilot region and generated from the amount of imported
electricity from outside pilot regions are covered in all the pilot schemes. All carbon
trading pilots in China have incorporated some mechanism to address supply-demand
imbalance and the resulting price uncertainty. During the pilot phase, banking is
allowed, but allowances cannot be carried forward beyond 2015, which is the ending
date of the pilot period. Borrowing is not authorized to improve the liquidity of the
carbon market. As shown in Table 1, all pilots allow to a different degree the use of
the China Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs), ranging from 5% of their CO2
compliance obligation in Beijing and Shanghai to 10% in Guangdong, Shenzhen and
Tianjin.

Table 1 The allowable use of CCERs in the seven carbon trading pilots
Maximum allowable use Local origin requirements
as percentages of the caps
(%)
Beijing
5
50%
Chongqing
8
No
Guangdong
10
70%
Hubei
10
100%
Shanghai
5
No
Shenzhen
10
No
Tianjin
10
No
CCERs have to meet the requirements of China’s national monitoring, reporting and
verification (MRV) regulation
The seven pilot regions are given considerable leeway to design their own
schemes. The pilot schemes have different coverage of sectors, ranging from four
sectors in Guangdong to 26 sectors in Shenzhen. The threshold to determine whether
an emissions source is covered differs across pilots, ranging from 5000 tCO2
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equivalent per year in Shenzhen from 2013-15 to 60000 tons of coal equivalent in
Hubei. A combination of the two factors leads the number of covered entities to differ
significantly, from 114 in Tianjin to 635 in Shenzhen. Consequently, the share of
covered emissions in the total emissions in each pilot region varies significantly,
ranging from 36% in Hubei and 38% in Shenzhen to 57% in Shanghai. Regimes differ
regarding the origin of CCERs. Shenzhen specifies that all CCERs have to be
generated inside China but outside the city, but Hubei requires that all have to come
from inside the province (see Table 1).
Ways to allocating allowances differ across pilots. While all pilots allocate all
or the majority of allowances for free, such allocations are based on grandfathering,
benchmarking or in both. Even if allowances are grandfathered on a historical basis,
Chongqing is based on the highest emissions in any of the years from 2008 to 2012 to
reduce the effect of whipping the fast ox to the extent possible, while other pilots are
based on the average emissions levels over the period 2009-12. In one given pilot, for
some sectors grandfathering is based on their historical emissions, while for other
sectors it is based on their historical emissions intensities.
Pilots also differ when coming to compliance. While Beijing opts out the
auction to provide the last opportunity for those enterprises of shortfall allowances to
meet their compliance obligations, some pilots like Shanghai and Shenzhen auction
additional allowances for enterprises of shortfall allowances at the end of that trading
day to comply their obligations for 2013. Even if Shanghai and Shenzhen opt for the
last auction for enterprises of shortfall allowances, they reason and accordingly set
their reserve price differently. While all pilots impose a fine on non-complying
entities, compliance rules vary across pilots, ranging from deducting a certain amount
of shortfall allowances from the amount to be allocated to non-complying enterprises
in the following year to charging the non-complying entities at 3-5 times the
prevailing average market prices for each shortfall allowance. Non-complying entities
in the Hubei pilot face both fines and deduction of shortfall allowances. They are
charged at 1-3 times the yearly average market prices for each shortfall allowance,
with the amount of penalty imposed on them capped at Yuan 150000, and two times
the amount of their shortfall allowances are deducted from the amount to be allocated
in the following year.
Since Shenzhen launched its first trading on 18 June 2013, Shanghai, Beijing
Guangdong, and Tianjin, in turn, launched their first trading prior to the end of 2013.
These five pilots have to comply with their emissions obligations for the year 2013
before the first compliance deadlines, which are set in the end of the first half of 2014.
As shown in Table 2, the first-year performance of the five pilots examined is
generally good. The better than expected performance of the pilots encourages other
regions to develop carbon trading. Meantime, there are significant variations in the
MRV and the prices of allowances across the seven pilots. On top of these facts,
ensuring China’s commitment to cap its carbon emissions around 2030 to be met adds
the urgency to further develop emissions trading scheme to complement with
administrative means on which China has relied mostly to achieve its increasingly
stringent energy-saving and carbon intensity goals (DCCNDRC, 2015). This raises
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the issue of future development of carbon trading in China.
Table 2 Five carbon trading pilots’ compliance rate in the first compliance year

Beijing
Guangdong
Shanghai
Shenzhen
Tianjin

Measured against
enterprises (%)
97.1
98.9
100
99.4
96.5

Measured against
allowances (%)
Not available
99.97
100
99.7
Not available

There are two ways for China to establish a national carbon market. One is to
establish a nationwide emissions trading scheme (ETS) by linking those existing pilot
carbon trading schemes that meet all the qualification conditions to be integrated into
a national linked system. Another way is that, based on experience and lessons
learned in the pilots, China establishes a national ETS, and until a full-fledged
national ETS is established and works, regional ETS continues to function in parallel,
but those entities covered in the existing regional carbon trading pilots will be
unconditionally integrated into a nationwide ETS scheme if they meet the threshold
set by a nationwide regime, which is expected to be much higher than ones set in most
of the existing regional carbon trading pilots. Each of the options has its own pros and
cons in China’s context, and needs weighted against a variety of criteria including
administrative costs.
It seems that China has opted for the second option, and that the central
government will determine the coverage of greenhouse gases and scope of sectors
included. One senior NDRC official announced in February 2015 that China plans to
initially include six sectors in its national ETS: power generation, metallurgy and
nonferrous metals, building materials, chemicals, and aviation. The threshold for an
emissions source to be covered will be set at 26000 tons of CO2 equivalent per year,
giving China’s carbon market estimated at three to four billion tons of CO2 emissions
(Lin, 2015). This would establish China’s ETS as the world’s largest scheme, twice
the size of the EU ETS, the current world’s largest ETS. With a three-year pilot phase,
such a nationwide carbon market will become fully functional after 2019 (DCCNDRC,
2015; Lin, 2015).
However, no matter which option takes in the end, it is important to ensure
that all the emissions data are properly measured, reported and verified in an aim to
make each unit of emissions reduction reliable and comparable across regions. This is
a prerequisite to link fragmented regional carbon markets and trade allowances across
regions, and thus to ensure that a nationwide carbon emissions trading scheme
functions properly in China. To that end, a national ETS legislation needs to be
established to authorize emission trading at the national level, providing united
guidelines and methodologies on ETS design and operation and enforcement of MRV
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and penalties for non-compliance at the minimum, ascribing allowances as financial
assets and defining their valid duration in an aim to generate economically valuable
and environmentally-credible reductions and to provide a solid basis for building a
sound national ETS. The recently released interim measures for carbon emissions
trading (NDRC, 2014b) moves in the right direction, but that is not enough. Not only
more specific details of such interim measures need to be worked out, but more
importantly the provisions governing emissions trading across regions in the form of
interim measures are needed to be elevated to a level of the greater legal strength,
ideally to national law. Given that process may take much time, they are needed to be
elevated at least to the State Council’s regulation. The necessity is at least because
dispute could become more intensive and frequent as the carbon market expands
beyond the institutional jurisdiction of administrative regions.

4 Concluding remarks: why might the outcomes this time be different from the
previous ones?
Concerns about a range of environmental stresses, along with worries over energy
security as a result of steeply rising oil imports, have sparked China’s determination to
improve energy efficiency and cut pollutants, and to increase the use of clean energy
in order to help its transition to a low-carbon, green economy. This is clearly reflected
by the key decisions of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of
Communist Party of China to assign the market a decisive role in allocating resources
and to build ecological civilization systems and mechanisms.
This outlook is not completely new. Indeed, President Hu Jintao and Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao had recognized the seriousness of environmental degradation in
China, and accordingly insisted that the conventional Chinese path of encouraging
economic growth at the expense of the environment has to be changed. As a first but
most important step to clean up the country’s development act, Messrs. Hu and Wen
incorporated for the first time energy-saving and environmental goals into the national
five-year economic blueprint for China. This change was a double-edged sword. It
distinguished their vision of China’s development from that of their predecessors, but
also created a test of their leadership. Overall, China had limited success on the
environmental front during their tenure.
Given that environmental compliance costs would be higher now than before and
are increasing as emissions targets become increasingly stringent on the one hand and
that dodging of environmental regulations is widespread and common in China on the
other hand, why might the outcomes this time be different from the previous ones?
First, maintaining social harmony and stability has been the top priority in China,
and the environment issue, reflected by pollution disputes and sudden environment
incidents,6 has been one of the leading causes of social unrest in the Chinese society
6

712 sudden environment incidents broke out in 2013 in China. While the number of
such incidents was reduced to 471 in 2014, this record still means nine incidents every
seven days (MEP, 2014 and 2015).
19

(Zhang, 2007). If not addressed appropriately, widespread dissatisfaction and disputes
could challenge the authority and legitimacy of China’s Communist Party’s ruling.
Second, the need for improved environmental quality has been raised to
unprecedented importance. In March 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said to about
3000 delegates to China’s legislature that China will “declare war against pollution as
we declared war against poverty” after nearly every Chinese city monitored for
pollution failed to meet state standards in 2013. If China’s accomplishment and
worldwide recognition of eradiating poverty could be considered as some kind of
predictor, this would provide some credibility of winning anti-pollution. In line with
this public acknowledgement at the highest level that China is facing an
environmental crisis, as discussed in the paper, China is attempting to cap coal
consumption, and is making unprecedented efforts toward upgrading the economy,
eliminating outdated energy producers and industrial plants, tackling the perennial
problem of overcapacity, and promoting clean and green technology.
Third, dense smog and haze has become a major issue that affects Chinese
people’s lives. A combination of mounting public complaints about smog and the
growing standards of living not only makes people feel the necessity for more
anti-pollution measures, but also increases public support for these policies and
measures.
Fourth, the governments at all levels take broad approaches to tackling
environmental issues. While having relied mostly on administrative means to date,
China has realized that administrative measures are effective but not efficient. China
is increasingly harnessing market forces to reduce its energy consumption and cut
carbon and other conventional pollutants and genuinely transit to a low-carbon, green
economy. Such market-based instruments include, but are not limited to, moving
away from the energy pricing entirely by the central government in the centrally
planned economy towards a more market-oriented pricing mechanism, reforming its
current narrow coverage of resource taxation and the resource tax levied by revenue
rather than existing extracted volume, experimenting with seven pilot carbon trading
schemes, and implementing a system for chargeable use of resources and a system for
ecological compensation. Moreover, given many environmental issues of a
cross-border nature, the neighboring regions, such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region,
Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, now increasingly act collectively rather
than on their own. These collective and coordinated efforts significantly increase their
effectiveness in combating the pollution.
Fifth, implementation holds the key to actually achieving the desired outcomes,
and there are encouraging signs that the Chinese government is strengthening existing
efforts and is taking additional steps in this direction. Indeed, enacting the policies
and measures targeted for energy saving and pollution cutting just signals a goodwill
and determination of China’s leaders. To actually achieve the desired outcomes,
however, requires strict implementation and coordination of these policies and
measures. This will be a decisive factor in determining the prospects for whether
China will clean up its development act and meet its carbon intensity target in 2020
and honor its commitments to cap its carbon emissions around 2030.
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Based on these facts and observations, I am cautiously optimistic that China will
be able to accomplish a great deal on the environmental front. It is in China’s interest
to not only sustain its economic growth, but to also ensure its standing in the world
community to be seen as a positive force in addressing environmental problems. If
President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang can make China “green,” history
will record their contribution as equal to Mao Zedong’s achieving China’s
independence, and Deng Xiaoping’s creation of a more prosperous country.
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